The Holy Family
The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Criticism
The Holy Family – Notes from Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1956
The Holy Family, or Critique of Critical Critique. Against Bruno Bauer and Co. is the first joint work of Karl Marx and Frederick Engels. At the end of August 1844 Marx and Engels met in Paris and their meeting was the beginning of’ their joint creative work in all fields of theoretical and practical revolutionary activity. By this time Marx and Engels had completed the transition from idealism to materialism and from revolutionary democratism to communism. The polemic The Holy Family was written in Paris in autumn 1844. It reflects the progress in the formation of Marx and Engels’s revolutionary materialistic world outlook.
In The Holy Family Marx and Engels give a devastating criticism of the subjectivist views of the Young Hegelians from the position of militant materialists. They, also criticize Hegel’s own idealistic philosophy: giving credit for the rational element in his dialectics, they criticize the mystic side of it.
The Holy Family
Foreword
The Holy Family
Chapter I “Critical Criticism in the Form of a Master-Bookbinder“, Or Critical Criticism As Herr Reichardt
Critical Criticism, however superior to the mass it deems itself, nevertheless has boundless pity for the mass. And therefore Criticism has so loved the mass that it sent its only begotten son, that all who believe in him may not be lost, but may have Critical life. Criticism was made mass and dwells amongst us and we behold its glory, the glory of the only begotten son of the father. In other words, Criticism becomes socialistic and speaks of “works on pauperism.“ It considers it not a crime to be equal to God but empties itself and takes the form of a bookbinder and humbles itself even to nonsense, yea, even to Critical nonsense in foreign languages. It, whose heavenly virginal purity shrinks from contact with the sinful leprous mass, overcomes itself to the extent of taking notice of " Boz " and " all original writers on pauperism" and "has for years been following this evil of the present time step by step"; it scorns writing for experts, it writes for the general public, banning all outlandish expressions, all "Latin intricacies, all professional jargon". It bans all that from the works of others, for it would be too much to expect Criticism itself to submit to "this administrative regulation". And yet it does do so partly, renouncing with admirable ease, if not the words themselves, at least their content. And who will reproach it for using "the huge heap of unintelligible foreign words" when it repeatedly proves that it does not understand those words itself? Here are a few samples:
“That is why the institutions of mendicancy inspire them with horror.“
“A doctrine of responsibility in which every motion of human thought becomes an image of Lot's wife .“
“On the keystone of this really profound edifice of art .“
“This is the main content of Stein's political testament, which the great statesman handed in even before retiring from the active service of the government and from all its transactions.“
“This people had not yet any dimensions at that time for such extensive freedom.“
“By palavering with fair assurance at the end of his publicistic work that only confidence was still lacking.“
The Holy Family
Chapter II “Critical Criticism“ As a ‘Mill-Owner’ [3] , Or Critical Criticism As Herr Jules Faucher
After rendering most substantial services to self-consciousness by humiliating itself to the extent of nonsense in foreign languages, and thereby at the same time freeing the world from pauperism, Criticism still further humiliates itself to the extent of nonsense in practice and history . It masters " English questions of the day " and gives us a genuinely critical outline of the history of English industry.
Criticism, which is self-sufficient, and complete and perfect in itself, naturally cannot recognise history as it really took place, for that would mean recognising the base mass in all its mass-like mass nature, whereas the problem is precisely to redeem the mass from its mass nature. History is therefore freed from its mass nature, and Criticism, which has a free attitude to its object, calls to history: " You ought to have happened in such and such a way!" All the laws of Criticism have retrospective force: prior to the decrees of Criticism, history behaved quite differently from how it did after them. Hence mass-type history, so-called real history, deviates considerably from Critical history, as it takes place in Heft VII of the Literatur-Zeitung from page 4 onwards.
In mass-type history there were no factory towns before there were factories ; but in Critical history, in which, as already in Hegel , the son begets his father, Manchester, Bolton and Preston were flourishing factory towns before factories were even thought of. In real history the cotton industry was founded mainly on Hargreaves' jenny and Arkwright's throstle, Crompton's mule being only an improvement of the spinning jenny according to the new principle discovered by Arkwright. But Critical history knows how to make distinctions: it scorns the one-sidedness of the jenny and the throstle, and gives the crown to the mule as the speculative identity of the extremes. In reality, the invention of the throstle and the mule immediately made possible the application of water-power to those machines, but Critical Criticism sorts out the principles lumped together by crude history and makes this application come only later, as something quite special. In reality the invention of the steam-engine preceded all the above-mentioned inventions; according to Criticism it is the crown of them all and the last.
In reality the business ties between Liverpool and Manchester in their present scope were the result of the export of English goods; according to Criticism they are the cause of the export and both are the result of the proximity of the two towns. In reality nearly all goods from Manchester go to the Continent via Hull ,according to Criticism via Liverpool.
In reality all grades of wages exist in English factories, from Is 6d to 40s and more; but according to Criticism only one rate is paid — 11s. In reality the machine replaces manual labour ; according to Criticism it replaces thought . In reality the association of workers for wage rises is allowed in England, but according to Criticism it is prohibited, for when the Mass wants to allow itself anything it must first ask Criticism. In reality factory labour is extremely tiring and gives rise to specific diseases — there are even special medical works on them; according to Criticism "excessive exertion cannot be a hindrance to work, for the power is provided by the machine". In reality the machine is a machine; according to Criticism it has a will, for as it does not rest, neither can the worker, and he is subordinated to an alien will.
The Holy Family
Chapter III “The Thoroughness of Critical Criticism“, Or Critical Criticism As Herr J. (Jungnitz?) [6]
The Holy Family
Chapter IV “Critical Criticism“ As the Tranquillity of Knowledge, Or “Critical Criticism“ As Herr Edgar
1) Flora Tristan's " Union Ouvrière [8]
The French Socialists maintain that the worker makes everything, produces everything and yet has no rights, no possessions, in short, nothing at all. Criticism answers in the words of Herr Edgar , the personification of the tranquillity of Knowledge :
"To be able to create everything, a stronger consciousness is needed than that of the worker. Only the opposite of the above proposition would be true: the worker makes nothing, therefore he has nothing; but the reason why he makes nothing is that his work is always individual, having as its object his most personal needs, and is everyday work."
Here Criticism achieves a height of abstraction in which it regards only the creations of its own thought and generalities which contradict all reality as "something", indeed as " everything" , The worker creates nothing because he creates only "individual", that is, perceptible, palpable, spiritless and un-Critical objects, which are an abomination in the eyes of pure Criticism. Everything that is real and living is un-Critical, of a mass nature, and therefore "nothing"; only the ideal, fantastic creatures of Critical Criticism are "everything" .
The worker creates nothing, because his work remains individual, having only his individual needs as its object, that is, because in the present world system the individual interconnected branches of labour are separated from, and even opposed to, one another; in short, because labour is not organized . Criticism's own proposition, if taken in the only reasonable sense it can possibly have, demands the organization of labour. Flora Tristan, in an assessment of whose work this great proposition appears, puts forward the same demand and is treated en canaille for her insolence in anticipating Critical Criticism. Anyhow, the proposition that the worker creates nothing is absolutely crazy except in the sense that the individual worker produces nothing whole , which is tautology. Critical Criticism creates nothing, the worker creates everything; and so much so that even his intellectual creations put the whole of Criticism to shame; the English and the French workers provide proof of this. The worker creates even man; the critic will never he anything but sub-human though on the other hand, of course, he has the satisfaction of being a Critical critic.
"Flora Tristan is an example of the feminine dogmatism which must have a formula and constructs it out of the categories of what exists."
Criticism does nothing but "construct formulae out of the categories of what exists'', namely, out of the existing Hegelian philosophy and the existing social aspirations. Formulae, nothing but formulae. And despite ail its invectives against dogmatism, it condemns itself to dogmatism and even to feminine dogmatism. It is and remains an old woman — faded, widowed Hegelian philosophy which paints and adorns its body, shrivelled into the most repulsive abstraction, and ogles all over Germany in search of a wooer.
2) Béraud on Prostitutes
Herr Edger, taking pity on social questions, meddles also in "conditions of prostitutes" (Heft V, p. 26).
He criticizes Paris Police Commissioner Be´raud's book on prostitution because he is concerned with the "point of view" from which "B´raud considers the attitude of prostitutes to society" The "tranquillity of knowledge" is surprised to see that a policeman adopts the point of view of the police, and it gives the mass to understand that that point of view is quite wrong. But it does not reveal its own point of view. Of course not! When Criticism takes up with prostitutes it cannot be expected to do so in public.
3) Love
In order to complete its transformation into the ''tranquillity of knowledge", Critical Criticism must first seek to dispose of love . Love is a passion, and nothing is more dangerous for the tranquillity of knowledge than passion. That is why, speaking of Madame von Paalzow's novels, which, he assures us, he has "thoroughly studied ". Herr Edgar is amazed at " a childish thing like so-called love ". It is a horror and abomination and excites the wrath of Critical Criticism, makes it almost as bitter as gall, indeed, insane.
"Love ... is a cruel goddess, and like every deity she wishes to possess the whole of man and is not satisfied until he has surrendered to her not merely his soul, but his physical self. The worship of love is suffering, the peak of this worship is self-immolation, suicide."
In order to change love into "Moloch", the devil incarnate, Herr Edgar first changes it into a goddess. When love has become a goddess, i.e., a theological object, it is of course submitted to theological criticism; moreover, it is known that god and the devil are not far apart. Herr Edgar changes love into a "goddess", a, "cruel goddess" at that, by changing man who loves , the love of man , into a man of love; by making " love " a being apart, separate from man and as such independent. By this simple process, by changing the predicate into the subject, all the attributes and manifestations of human nature can be Critically transformed into their negation and into alienations of human nature." Thus, for example, Critical Criticism makes criticism, as a predicate and activity of man, into a subject apart, criticism which relates itself to itself and is therefore Critical Criticism: a "Moloch", the worship of which consists in the self-immolation, the suicide of man, and in particular of his ability to think.
"Object," exclaims, the tranquillity of knowledge, "object is the right expression, for the beloved is important to the lover [denn der Geliebte ist dem Liebenden] (there is no feminine) only as this external object of the emotion of his soul, as the object in which he wishes to see his selfish feeling satisfied."
Object! Horrible! There is nothing more damnable, more profane, more mass-like than an object — agrave; bas the object! How could absolute subjectivity, the actus puris, "pure" Criticism, not see in love its bête noire , that Satan incarnate, in love, which first really teaches man to believe in the objective world outside himself, which not only makes man into an object, but even the object into a man!
Love, continues the tranquillity of knowledge, beside itself, is not even content with turning man into the category of "object" for another man, it even makes him into a definite, real object, into this bad-individual (see Hegel's Phänomenologie on the categories "This" and "That", where there is also a polemic against the bad " This "), external object, which does not remain internal, hidden in the brain, but is sensuously manifest.
Love
Lives not only in the brain immured.
No, the beloved is a sensuous object , and if Critical Criticism is to condescend to recognition of an object, it demands at the very least a senseless object. But love is an un-Critical, un-Christian materialist.
Finally, love even makes one human being " this external object of the emotion of the soul" of another, the object in which the selfish feeling of the other finds its satisfaction, a selfish feeling because it looks for its own essence in the other, and that must not be. Critical Criticism is so free from all selfishness that for it the whole range of human essence is exhausted by its own self.
Herr Edgar, of course, does not tell us in what way the beloved differs from the other "external objects of the emotion of the soul in which the selfish feelings of men find their satisfaction". The spiritually profound, meaningful, highly expressive object of love means nothing to the tranquillity of knowledge but the abstract formula: "this external object of the emotion of the soul", much as the comet means nothing to the speculative natural philosopher but "negativity". By making man the external object of the emotion of his soul, man does in fact attach "importance" to him, Critical Criticism itself admits, but only objective importance , so to speak, while the importance which Criticism attaches to objects is none other than that which it attaches to itself. Hence this importance lies not in "bad external being ", but in the " Nothing" of the Critically important object.
If the tranquillity of knowledge has no object in real man, it has, on the other hand, a cause in humanity . Critical love " is careful above all not to forget the cause behind the personality, for that cause is none other than the cause of humanity". Un-Critical love does not separate humanity from the personal, individual man.
Love itself, as an abstract passion, which comes we know not whence and goes we know not whither, is incapable of`having an interest in internal development."
In the eyes of the tranquillity of knowledge, love is an abstract passion according to the speculative terminology in which the concrete is called abstract and the abstract concrete.
The maid was not born in that valley, But where she came from, no one knew. And soon all trace of her did vanish Once she had bidden them adieu. [9]
For abstraction, love is "the maid from a foreign land" who has no dialectical passport and is therefore expelled from the country by the Critical police.
The passion of love is incapable of having an interest in internal development because it cannot be construed a priori , because its development is a real one which takes place in the world of the senses and between real individuals. But the main interest of speculative construction is the "Whence" and the "Whither". The "Whence" is the " necessity of a concept, its proof and deduction" (Hegel). The "Whither" is the determination "by which each individual link of the speculative circular course, as the animated content of the method, is at the same time the beginning of a new link" (Hegel). Hence, only if its "Whence" and its "Whither" could be construed a priori would love deserve the "interest" of speculative Criticism.
What Critical Criticism combats here is not merely love but everything living, everything which is immediate, every sensuous experience, any and every real experience, the "Whence" and the "Whither" of which one never knows beforehand.
By overcoming love, Herr Edgar has completely asserted himself as the "tranquillity of knowledge", and now by his treatment of Proudhon , he can show great virtuosity in knowledge, the " object " of which is no longer "this external object ", and a still greater lack of love for the French language.
4) Proudhon
It was not Proudhon himself, but "Proudhon's point of view" , Critical Criticism informs us, that wrote Qu'est-ce que la propriété ?
"I begin my exposition of Proudhon's point of view by characterizing its" (the point of view's) "work, " Qu'est-ce que la propriété ?" [10]
As only the works of the Critical point of view possess a character of their own, the Critical characterization necessarily begins by giving a character to Proudhon's work. Herr Edgar gives this work a character by translating it. He naturally gives it a bad character, for he turns it into an object of "Criticism"
Proudhon's work, therefore, is subjected to a double attack by Herr Edgar — an unspoken one in his characterising translation and an outspoken one in his Critical comments. We shall see that Herr Edgar is more devastating when he translates than when he comments.
Characterizing Translation No. 1
"I do not wish" (says the Critically translated Proudhon) "to give any system of the new; I wish for nothing but the abolition of privilege, the abolition of slavery.... Justice, nothing but justice, that is what I mean."
The characterized Proudhon confines himself to will and opinion, because "good will" and unscientific "opinion" are characteristic attributes of the un-Critical Mass. The characterized Proudhon behaves with the humility that is fitting for the mass and subordinates what he wishes to what he does not wish. He does not presume to wish to give a system of the new, he wishes less, he even wishes for nothing but the abolition of privilege, etc. Besides this Critical subordination of the will he has to the will he has not, his very first word is marked by a characteristic lack of logic. A writer who begins his book by saying that he does not wish to give any system of the new, should then tell us what he does wish to give: whether it is a systematised old or an unsystematised new. But does the characterized Proudhon, who does not wish to give any system of the new, wish to give the abolition of privilege? No. He just wishes it.
The real Proudhon says: "Je ne fais pas de système; je demande la fin du privilège," etc. I make no system, I demand, etc., that is to say, the real Proudhon declares that he does not pursue any abstract scientific aims, but makes immediately practical demands on society. And the demand he makes is not an arbitrary one. It is motivated and justified by his whole argument and is the summary of that argument for, he says, "justice, rien que justice; tel est le resumé' de mon discours." With his "Justice, nothing but justice, that is what I mean", the characterized Proudhon gets himself into a position which is all the more embarrassing as he means much more. According to Herr Edgar, for example, he "means" that philosophy has not been practical enough, he " means " to refute Charles Comte, and so forth.
The Critical Proudhon asks: "Ought man then always to be unhappy?" In other words, he asks whether unhappiness is man's moral destiny. The real Proudhon is a light-minded Frenchman and he asks whether unhappiness is a material necessity, a must. (L'homme doit-il être éternellement malheureux? )
The mass-type Proudhon says: "Et, sans m'arrêter aux explications â toute fin des entrepreneurs de réformes, accusant de la détresse générale, ceux-ci la lâcheté et l'impéritie du pouvoir, ceux-là les conspirateurs et les émeutes, d'autres l'ignorance et la corruption générale", etc.
The expression "à toute fin" being a bad mass-type expression that is not in the mass-type German dictionaries, the Critical, Proudhon naturally omits this more exact definition of the "explanations". This term is taken from mass-type French jurisprudence, and "explications ... toute fin" means explanations which preclude any objection. The Critical Proudhon censures the "Reformists" , a French Socialist Party [11] ; the massy Proudhon censures the initiators of reforms. The mass-type Proudhon distinguishes various classes of "entrepreneurs de réformes". These (ceux-ci) say one thing , those (ceix-là) say another , others (d'autres) a third. The Critical Proudhon, on the other hand, makes the same reformists "accuse now one, then another, then a third", which in any case is proof of their inconstancy. The real Proudhon, who follows mass-type French practice, speaks of "les conspirateurs et les émeutes", i.e., first of the conspirators and then of their activity, revolts. The Critical Proudhon, on the other hand, who has lumped together the various classes of reformists, classifies the rebels and hence says: the conspirators and the rebels. The mass-type Proudhon speaks of ignorance and "general corruption" . The Critical Proudhon changes ignorance into stupidity, "corruption" into '"depravity, and finally, as a Critical critic, makes the stupidity general. He himself gives an immediate example of it by putting "générale" in the singular instead of the plural. He writes: "l'ignorance et la corruption générale" for general stupidity and depravity. According to un-Critical French grammar this should be: "l'ignorance et la corruption générales.
The characterized Proudhon, who speaks and thinks otherwise than the mass-type one, necessarily went through quite a different course of education. He "questioned the masters of science, read hundreds of volumes of philosophy and law, etc., and at last " he "realised that we have never yet grasped the meaning of the words Justice, Equity, Freedom". The real Proudhon thought he had realised at first (je crus d'abord reconnaître) what the Critical Proudhon realised only "at last". The Critical alteration of d'abord into enfin is necessary because the mass may not think it realises anything "at first". The mass-type Proudhon tells explicitly how he was staggered by the unexpected result of his studies and distrusted it. Hence he decided to carry out a "countertest" and asked himself: "Is it possible that mankind has so long and so universally been mistaken over the principles of the application of morals? How and why was it mistaken?" etc. He made the correctness of his observations dependent on the solution of these questions. He found that in morals, as in all other branches of knowledge, errors "are stages of science" . The Critical Proudhon, on the other hand, immediately trusted the first impression that his studies of political economy, law and the like made upon him. Needless to say, the mass cannot proceed in any thorough way; it is bound to raise the first results of its investigations to the level of indisputable truths. It has "reached the end before it has started, before it has measured itself with its opposite". Hence, "it is seen" later "that it is not yet at the beginning when it thinks it has reached the end".
The Critical Proudhon therefore continues his reasoning in the most untenable and incoherent way.
"Our knowledge of moral laws is not complete from the beginning; thus it can for some time suffice for social progress, but in the long run it will lead us on a false path."
The Critical Proudhon does not give any reason why incomplete knowledge of moral laws call suffice for social progress even for a single day. The real Proudhon, having asked himself whether and why mankind could universally and so long have been mistaken and having found as the solution that all errors are stages of science and that our most imperfect judgments contain a sum of truths sufficient for a certain number of inductions and for a certain area of practical life, beyond which number and which area they lead theoretically to the absurd and practically to decay, is in a position to say that even imperfect knowledge of moral laws can suffice for social progress for a time.
The Critical Proudhon says:
"But if new knowledge has become necessary, a bitter struggle arises between the old prejudices and the new idea."
How can a struggle arise against an opponent who does not yet exist? Admitted, the Critical Proudhon has told us that a new idea has become necessary but he has not said that it has already come into existence .
The mass-type Proudhon says:
"Once higher knowledge has become indispensable it is never lacking ", it is therefore ready at hand. " It is then that the struggle begins."
The Critical Proudhon asserts: "It is man's destiny to learn step by step", as if man did not have a quite different destiny, namely, that of being man, and as if that learning "step by step" necessarily brought him a step farther. I can go step by step and arrive at the very point from which I set out. The un-Critical Proudhon speaks, not of "destiny", but of the condition (condition) for man to learn not step by step (pas à pas) , but by degrees (par degrés) . The Critical Proudhon says to himself:
"Among the principles upon which society rests there is one which society does not understand, which is spoilt by society's ignorance and is the cause of all evil. Nevertheless, man honours this principle" and "wills it, for otherwise it would have no influence. Now this principle which is true in its essence ; but is false in the way we conceive it ... what is it?"
In the first sentence the Critical Proudhon says that the principle is spoilt, misunderstood by society,hence that it is correct in itself. In the second sentence he admits superfluously that it is true in its essence; nevertheless he reproaches society with willing and honouring "this principle". The mass-type Proudhon, on the other hand, reproaches society with willing and honouring not this principle, but this principle as falsified by our ignorance (" Ce principe ... tel que notre ignorance l'a fait, est honoré "). The Critical Proudhon finds the essence of the principle in its untrue form true . The mass-type Proudhon finds that the essence of the falsified principle is our incorrect conception, but that it is true in its object (objet) , just as the essence of alchemy and astrology is our imagination, but their objects — the movement of the heavenly bodies and the chemical properties of substances — are true.
The Critical Proudhon continues his monologue:
The object of our investigation is the law, the definition of the social principle. Now the politicians, i.e., the men of social science, are a prey to complete lack of clarity...; but as there is a reality at the basis of every error, in their books we shall find the truth, which they have brought into the world without knowing it."
The Critical Proudhon has a most fantastic way of reasoning. From the fact that the politicians are ignorant and unclear, he goes on in the most arbitrary fashion to say that a reality lies at the basis of every error, which can all the less he doubted as there is a reality at the basis of every error — in the person of the one who errs. From the fact that a reality lies at the basis of every error he goes on to conclude that truth is to be found in the books of politicians. And finally he even makes out that the politicians have brought this truth into the world . Had they brought it into the world we should not need to look for it in their books.
The mass-type Proudhon says:
"The politicians do not understand one another (ne s'entendent pas); their error is therefore a subjective one, having its origin in them (donc c'est en eux qu'est l'erreur). " Their mutual misunderstanding proves their one-sidedness. They confuse "their private opinion with common sense", and "as", according to the previous deduction, "every error has a true reality as its object, their books must contain the truth, which they unconsciously have put there" — i.e., in their books — "but have not brought into the world" (dans leurs livres doit se trouver la vérité qu' à leur insu its y auront mise).
The Critical Proudhon asks himself: "What is justice, what is its essence, its character, its meaning?" As if it had some meaning apart from its essence and character. The un-Critical Proudhon asks: What is its principle, its character and its formula (formule) ? The formula is the principle as a principle of scientific reasoning. In the mass-type French language there is an essential difference between formule and signification. In the Critical French language there is none.
After his highly irrelevant disquisitions, the Critical Proudhon pulls himself together and exclaims:
"Let us try to get somewhat closer to our object."
The un-Critical Proudhon, on the other hand, who arrived at his object long ago, tries to attain more precise and more positive definitions of his object (d'arriver à quelque chose de plus précis et de plus positif).
For the Critical Proudhon "the law" is a " definition of what is right", for the un-Critical Proudhon it is a " statement" (déclaration) of it. The un-Critical Proudhon disputes the view that right is made by law. But a "definition of the law" can mean that the law is defined just as it can mean that it defines. Previously, the Critical Proudhon himself spoke about the definition of the social principle in this latter sense. To be sure, it is unseemly of the mass-type Proudhon to make such nice distinctions.
Considering these differences between the Critically characterised Proudhon and the real Proudhon, it is no wonder that Proudhon No. 1 seeks to prove quite different things than Proudhon No. 2.
The Critical Proudhon
" seeks to prove by the experience of history " that "if the idea that we have of what is just and right is false, evidently" (he tries to prove it in spite of its evidence) "all its applications in law must be bad, all our institutions must be defective".
The mass-type Proudhon is far from wishing to prove what is evident. He says instead:
"If the idea that we have of what is just and right were badly defined, if it were incomplete or even false, it is evident that all our legislative applications would be bad", etc.
What, then, does the un-Critical Proudhon wish to prove?
"This hypothesis," he continues, "of the perversion of justice in our understanding, and as a necessary consequence in our actions, would be an established fact if the opinions of men concerning the concept of justice and its applications had not remained constantly the same, if at different times they had undergone modifications; in a word, if there had been progress in ideas."
And precisely that inconstancy, that change, that progress "is what history proves by the most striking testimonies". And the un-Critical Proudhon quotes these striking testimonies of history. His Critical double, who proves a completely different proposition by the experience of history, also presents that experience itself in a different way.
According to the real Proudhon, "the wise" (les sages), according to the Critical Proudhon, "the philosophers", foresaw the fall of the Roman Empire. The Critical Proudhon can of course consider only philosophers to be wise men. According to the real Proudhon, Roman "rights were consecrated by ten centuries of law practice" or "administration of justice" (ces droits consacrés par une justice dix: fois séculaire) ; according to the Critical Proudhon, Rome had "rights consecrated by ten centuries of justice".
According to the same Proudhon No. 1, the Romans reasoned as follows:
"Rome ... was victorious through its policy and its gods; any reform in worship or public spirit would be stupidity and profanation" (according to the Critical Proudhon, sacrilège means not the profanation or desecration of a holy thing, as in the mass-type French language, but just profanation). "Had it wished to free the peoples, it would thereby have renounced its right." "Rome had thus fact and right in its favour," Proudhon No. 1 adds.
According to the un-Critical Proudhon, the Romans reasoned more logically. The fact was set out in detail:
"The slaves are the most fertile source of its wealth; the freeing of the peoples would therefore be the ruin of its finance. "
And the mass-type Proudhon adds, referring to law: "Rome's claims were justified by the law of nations ( droit des gens )." This way of proving the right of subjugation was completely in keeping with the Roman view on law. See the mass-type pandects: " jure gentium servitus invasit " (Fr. 4. D.I.I)."
According to the Critical Proudhon, "idolatry, slavery and softness" were "the basis of Roman institutions", of all its institutions without exception. The real Proudhon says: "Idolatry in religion, slavery in the state and Epicureanism in private life" (épicurisme in the ordinary French language is not synonymous with mollesse , softness) "were the basis of the institutions." Within that Roman situation there "appeared", says the mystic Proudhon, "the Word of God", whereas according to the real, rationalistic Proudhon, it was "a man who called himself the Word of God". In the real Proudhon this man calls the priests "vipers" (vipères); in the Critical Proudhon he speaks more courteously with them and calls them "serpents". In the former he speaks in the Roman way of "advocates" [Advokaten] , in the latter in the German way of "lawyers" [Rechtsgelehrte].
The Critical Proudhon calls the spirit of the French Revolution a spirit of contradiction, and adds:
"That is enough to realised that the new which replaced the old had on itself [an sich] nothing methodical and considered."
The Holy Family
Chapter V “Critical Criticism“ As a Mystery-Monger, Or “Critical Criticism“ As Herr Szeliga
“Critical Criticism" in its Szeliga-Vishnu incarnation provides an apotheosis of the Mystéres de Paris. Eugéne Sue is proclaimed a "Critical Critic". Hearing this, he may exclaim like Moliére's Bourgeois gentilhomme :
" Par ma foi, il y a plus de quarante ans que je dis de la prose, sans que j'en susse rien: et je vous suis le plus obligé du monde de m'avoir appris cela. "
Herr Szeliga prefaces his criticism with an aesthetic prologue. "The aesthetic prologue" gives the following explanation of the general meaning of the "Critical" epic and in particular of the Mystéres de Paris :
"The epic gives rise to the thought that the present in itself is nothing, and not only" (nothing and not only!) "the eternal boundary between past and future, but" (nothing, and not only, but) "but the gap that separates immortality from transience and must continually be filled.... Such is the general meaning of the Mystéres de Paris. "
The "aesthetic prologue" further asserts that "if the Critic wished he could also be a poet ".
The whole of Herr Szeliga's criticism will prove that assertion. It is " poetic fiction “ in every respect.
It is also a product of "free art" according to the definition of the latter given in the "aesthetic prologue" — it "invents something quite new, something that absolutely never existed before “.
Finally, it is even a Critical epic , for it is "the gap that separates immortality" — Herr Szeliga's Critical Criticism — from "transience" — Eugéne Sue's novel — and "must continually be filled".
1) "The Mystery of Degeneracy in Civilisation" and "The Mystery of Rightlessness in the State"
Feuerbach , we know, conceived the Christian ideas of the Incarnation, the Trinity, Immortality, etc., as the mystery of the Incarnation, the mystery of the Trinity, the mystery of Immortality. Herr Szeliga conceives all present world conditions as mysteries. But whereas Feuerbach disclosed real mysteries, Herr Szeliga makes mysteries out of real trivialities. His art is not that of disclosing what is hidden, but of hiding what is disclosed.
Thus he proclaims as mysteries degeneracy (criminals) within civilisation and rightlessness and inequality in the state. This means that socialist literature, which has revealed these mysteries, is still a mystery to Herr Szeliga, or that he wants to convert the best-known findings of that literature into a private mystery of "Critical Criticism."
We therefore need not go more deeply into Herr Szeliga's discourse on these mysteries; we shall merely draw attention to a few of the most brilliant points.
"Before the law and the judge everything is equal , the high and the low, the rich and the poor. This proposition stands at the head of the credo of the state ."
Of the state? The credo of most states starts, on the contrary, by making the high and the low, the rich and the poor unequal before the law.
"The gem-cutter Morel in his naive probity most clearly expresses the mystery" (the mystery of the antithesis of poor and rich) "when he says: If only the rich knew! If only the rich knew! The misfortune is that they do not know what poverty is."
Herr Szeliga does not know that Eugéne Sue commits an anachronism out of courtesy to the French bourgeoisie when he puts the motto of the burghers of Louis XIV's time " Ah! si le roi le savait! " in a modified form: " Ah! si le riche le savait! " into the mouth of the working man Morel who lived at the time of the Charte vérité " [14] In England and France, at least, this naive relation between rich and poor has ceased to exist. There the scientific representatives of wealth, the economists, have spread a very detailed understanding of the physical and moral misery of poverty. They have made up for that by proving that misery must remain because the present state of things must remain. In their solicitude they have even calculated the proportions in which the poor must be reduced in number by deaths for the good of the rich and for their own welfare .
If Eugene Sue depicts the taverns, hide-outs and language of criminals , Herr Szeliga discloses the " mystery “ that what the "author" wanted was not to depict that language or those hide-outs, but
"to teach us the mystery of the mainsprings of evil, etc." "It is precisely in the most crowded places ... that criminals feel at home ."
What would a natural scientist say if one were to prove to him that the bee's cell does not interest him as a bee's cell, that it has no mystery for one who has not studied it, because the bee "feels at home precisely" in the open air and on the flower? The hide-outs of the criminals and their language reflect the character of the criminal, they are part of his existence, their description is part of his description just as the description of the petite maison is part of the description of the femme galante .
For Parisians in general and even for the Paris police the hide-outs of criminals are such a "mystery" that at this very moment broad light streets are being laid out in the Cité ' to give the police access to them.
Finally, Eugéne Sue himself states that in the descriptions mentioned above he was counting " sur la curiosité, craintive " of his readers. M. Eugéne Sue has counted on the timid curiosity of his readers in all his novels. It is sufficient to recall Atar Gull, Salamandre, Plick and Plock , etc.
2) The Mystery of Speculative Construction
The mystery of the Critical presentation of the Mystéres de Paris is the mystery of speculative , of Hegelian construction . Once Herr Szeliga has proclaimed that "degeneracy within civilisation" and rightlessness in the state are "mysteries", i.e., has dissolved them in the category " mystery ", he lets "mystery" begin its speculative career . A few words will suffice to characterise speculative construction in general . Herr Szeliga's treatment of the Mystéres de Paris will give the application in detail .
If from real apples, pears, strawberries and almonds I form the general idea " Fruit “, if I go further and imagine that my abstract idea " Fruit “, derived from real fruit, is an entity existing outside me, is indeed the true essence of the pear, the apple, etc., then in the language of speculative philosophy — I am declaring that " Fruit “ is the " Substance “ of the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. I am saying, therefore, that to be a pear is not essential to the pear, that to be an apple is not essential to the apple; that what is essential to these things is not their real existence, perceptible to the senses, but the essence that I have abstracted from them and then foisted on them, the essence of my idea — " Fruit “. I therefore declare apples, pears, almonds, etc., to be mere forms of existence, modi , of " Fruit “ My finite understanding supported by my senses does of course distinguish an apple from a pear and a pear from an almond, but my speculative reason declares these sensuous differences inessential and irrelevant. It sees in the apple the same as in the pear, and in the pear the same as in the almond, namely " Fruit “. Particular real fruits are no more than semblances whose true essence is " the substance" — " Fruit “.
By this method one attains no particular wealth of definition . The mineralogist whose whole science was limited to the statement that all minerals are really " the Mineral" would be a mineralogist only in his imagination . For every mineral the speculative mineralogist Says "the Mineral", and his science is reduced to repeating this word as many times as there are real minerals.
Having reduced the different real fruits to the one "fruit" of abstraction — " the Fruit", speculation must, in order to attain some semblance of real content, try somehow to find its way back from " the Fruit", from the Substance to the diverse , ordinary real fruits, the pear, the apple, the almond, etc. It is as hard to produce real fruits from the abstract idea " the Fruit" as it is easy to produce this abstract idea from real fruits. Indeed, it is impossible to arrive at the opposite of an abstraction without relinquishing the abstraction.
The speculative philosopher therefore relinquishes the abstraction " the Fruit", but in a speculative, mystical fashion — with the appearance of not relinquishing it. Thus it is really only in appearance that he rises above his abstraction. He argues somewhat as follows:
If apples, pears, almonds and strawberries are really nothing but " the Substance", " the Fruit", the question arises: Why does " the Fruit" manifest itself to me sometimes as an apple, sometimes as a pear, sometimes as an almond? Why this semblance of diversity which so obviously contradicts my speculative conception of Unity , " the Substance", " the Fruit"?
This, answers the speculative philosopher, is because " the Fruit" is not dead, undifferentiated, motionless, but a living, self-differentiating, moving essence. The diversity of the ordinary fruits is significant not only for my sensuous understanding, but also for " the Fruit" itself and for speculative reason. The different ordinary fruits are different manifestations of the life of the "one Fruit"; they are crystallisations of " the Fruit" itself. Thus in the apple " the Fruit" gives itself an apple-like existence, in the pear a pear-like existence. We must therefore no longer say, as one might from the standpoint of the Substance: a pear is " the Fruit", an apple is " the Fruit", an almond is " the Fruit", but rather " the Fruit" presents itself as a pear, " the Fruit" presents itself as an apple, " the Fruit" presents itself as an almond; and the differences which distinguish apples, pears and almonds from one another are the self-differentiations of " the Fruit" and,.make the particular fiuits different members of the life-process of " the Fruit". Thus " the Fruit" is no longer an empty undifferentiated unity; it is oneness as allness, as " totality “ of fruits, which constitute an " organically linked series of members “. In every member of that series " the Fruit" gives itself a more developed, more explicit existence, until finally, as the " summary “ of all fruits, it is at the same time the living unity which contains all those fruits dissolved in itself just as it produces them from within itself, just as, for instance, all the limbs of the body are constantly dissolved in and constantly produced out of the blood.
We see that if the Christian religion knows only one Incarnation of God, speculative philosophy has as many incarnations as there are things, just as it has here in every fruit an incarnation of the Substance, of the Absolute Fruit. The main interest for the speculative philosopher is therefore to produce the existence of the real ordinary fruits and to say in some mysterious way that there are apples, pears, almonds and raisins. But the apples, pears, almonds and raisins that we rediscover in the speculative world are nothing but semblances of apples, semblances of pears, semblances of almonds and semblances of raisins, for they are moments in the life of " the Fruit", this abstract creation of the mind, and therefore themselves abstract creations of the mind . Hence what is delightful in this speculation is to rediscover all the real fruits there, but as fruits which have a higher mystical significance, which have grown out of the ether of your brain and not out of the material earth, which are incarnations of " the Fruit", of the Absolute Subject . When you return from the abstraction, the supernatural creation of the mind, " the Fruit", to real natural fruits, you give on the contrary the natural fruits a supernatural significance and transform them into sheer abstractions. Your main interest is then to point out the unity of " the Fruit" in all the manifestations of its life — the apple, the pear, the almond — that is, to show the mystical interconnection between these fruits, how in each one of them " the Fruit" realises itself by degrees and necessarily progresses, for instance, from its existence as a raisin to its existence as an almond. Hence the value of the ordinary fruits no longer consists in their natural qualities, but in their speculative quality, which gives each of them a definite place in the life-process of " the Absolute Fruit"
The ordinary man does not think he is saying anything extraordinary when he states that there are apples and pears. But when the philosopher expresses their existence in the speculative way he says something extraordinary . He performs a miracle by producing the real natural objects , the apple, the pear, etc., out of the unreal creation of the mind " the Fruit", i.e., by creating those fruits out of his own abstract reason , which he considers as an Absolute Subject outside himself, represented here as " the Fruit". And in regard to every object the existence of which he expresses, he accomplishes an act of creation.
It goes without saying that the speculative philosopher accomplishes this continuous creation only by presenting universally known qualities of the apple, the pear, etc., which exist in reality, as determining features invented by him, by giving the names of the real things to what abstract reason alone can create, to abstract formulas of reason, finally, by declaring his own activity, by which he passes from the idea of an apple to the idea of a pear, to be the self-activity of the Absolute Subject, "the Fruit"
In the speculative way of speaking, this operation is called comprehending Substance as Subject , as an inner process , as an Absolute Person, and this comprehension constitutes the essential character of Hegel's method.
These preliminary remarks were necessary to make Herr Szeliga intelligible. Only now, after dissolving real relations, e.g., law and civilisation, in the category of mystery and thereby making " Mystery “(das Geheimnis) into Substance, does he rise to the true speculative, Hegelian height and transforms " Mystery “ into a self-existing Subject incarnating itself in real situations and persons so that the manifestations of its life are countesses, marquises, grisettes, porters, notaries, charlatans, and love intrigues, balls, wooden doors, etc. Having produced the category " Mystery “ out of the real world, he produces the real world out of this category.
The mysteries of speculative construction in Herr Szeliga's presentation will be all the more visibly disclosed as he has an indisputable double advantage over Hegel . On the one hand, Hegel with masterly sophistry is able to present as a process of the imagined creation of the mind itself, of the Absolute Subject, the process by which the philosopher through sensory perception and imagination passes from one subject to another. On the other hand, however, Hegel very often gives a real presentation, embracing the thing itself, within the speculative presentation. This real development within the speculative development misleads the reader into considering the speculative development as real and the real as speculative.
With Herr Szeliga both these difficulties vanish. His dialectics have no hypocrisy or dissimulation. He performs his tricks with the most laudable honesty and the most ingenuous straightforwardness. But then he nowhere develops any real content , so that his speculative construction is free from all disturbing accessories, from all ambiguous disguises, and appeals to the eye in its naked beauty. In Herr Szeliga we also see a brilliant illustration of how speculation on the one hand apparently freely creates its object a priori out of itself and, on the other hand, precisely because it wishes to get rid by sophistry of the rational and natural dependence on the object , falls into the most irrational and unnatural bondage to the object, whose most accidental and most individual attributes it is obliged to construe as absolutely necessary and general.
3) "The Mystery of Educated Society"
After leading us through the lowest strata of society, for example through the criminals' taverns, Eugene Sue transports us to " haute volee “,' to a ball in the Quartier Saint-Germain.
This transition Herr Szeliga construes as follows:
" Mystery tries to evade examination by a ... twist: so far it appeared as the absolutely enigmatic, elusive and negative, in contrast to the true, real and positive; now it withdraws into the latter as its invisible content. But by doing so it gives up the unconditional possibility of becoming known."
"Mystery" which has so far appeared in contrast to the "true", the "real", the "positive", that is, to law and education, "now withdraws into the latter", that is, into the realm of education. It is certainly a mystere for Paris, if not of Paris, that " haute volee " is the exclusive realm of education. Herr Szeliga does not pass from the mysteries of the criminal world to those of aristocratic society; instead, " Mystery “ becomes the "invisible content" of educated society, its real essence . It is " not a new twist " of Herr Szeliga's designed to enable him to proceed to further examination; " Mystery “ itself takes this "new twist" in order to escape examination.
Before really following Eugene Sue where his heart leads him - to an aristocratic ball, Herr Szeliga resorts to the hypocritical twists of speculation which makes a priori constructions.
"One can naturally foresee what a solid shell 'Mystery' will choose to hide in; it seems, in fact , that it is of insuperable impenetrability ... that ... hence it may be expected that in general ... nevertheless a new attempt to pick out the kernel is here indispensable ."
Enough. Herr Szeliga has gone so far that the
" metaphysical subject, Mystery , now steps forward, light, self-confident and jaunty".
In order now to change aristocratic society into a "mystery", Herr Szeliga gives us a few considerations on " education ". He presumes aristocratic society to have all sorts of qualities that no man would look for in it, in order later to find the "mystery" that it does not possess those qualities. Then he presents this discovery as the "mystery" of educated society. Herr Szeliga wonders, for example, whether " general reason" (does he mean speculative logic?) constitutes the content of its " drawing-room talk ", whether "the rhythm and measure of love alone makes" it a "harmonious whole", whether "what we call general education is the form of the general, the eternal, the ideal ", i.e., whether what we call education is a metaphysical illusion. It is not difficult for Herr Szeliga to prophesy a priori in answer to his questions:
"It is to be expected, however ... that the answer will be in the negative."
The Holy Family Chapter VI
Absolute Critical Criticism, Or Critical Criticism As Herr Bruno
1) Absolute Criticism’s First Campaign
a) “Spirit“ and “Mass“
So far Critical Criticism has seemed to deal more or less with the Critical treatment of various mass-type objects. We now find it dealing with the absolutely Critical object, with itself. So far it has derived its relative glory from Critical debasement, rejection and transformation of definite mass-type objects and persons. It now derives its absolute glory from the Critical debasement, rejection and transformation of the Mass in general. Relative Criticism was faced with relative limits. Absolute Criticism is faced with an absolute limit, the limit of the Mass, the Mass as limit. Relative Criticism in its opposition to definite limits was itself necessarily a limited individual. Absolute Criticism, in its opposition to the general limit, to limit in general, is necessarily an absolute individual. As the various mass-type objects and persons have merged in the impure pulp of the “ Mass “, so has still seemingly objective and personal Criticism changed into “ pure Criticism “. So far Criticism has appeared to be more or less a quality of the Critical individuals: Reichardt, Edgar, Faucher, etc. Now it is the Subject and Herr Bruno is its incarnation.
So far mass character has seemed to be more or less the quality of the objects and persons criticised; now objects and persons have become the “ Mass “, and the “ Mass “ has become object and person. All previous Critical attitudes have been dissolved in the attitude of absolute Critical wisdom to absolute mass-type stupidity. This basic attitude appears as the meaning , the tendency and the keyword of Criticism’s previous deeds and struggles.
In accordance with its absolute character, “pure“ Criticism, as soon as it appears, will pronounce the differentiating “ cue “; nevertheless, as Absolute Spirit it must go through a dialectical process. Only at the end of its heavenly motion will its original concept be truly realised (see Hegel, Enzyklopädie ).
“But a few months ago,“ Absolute Criticism announces, “the Mass believed itself to be of gigantic strength and destined to world mastery within a time that it could count on its fingers.“ [17]
It was Herr Bruno Bauer , in Die gute Sache der Freiheit [The Good Cause of Freedom] (his “ own “ cause, of course), in Die Judenfrage , [18] etc., who counted on his fingers the time until the approaching world mastery, although he admitted he could not give the exact date. To the record of the sins of the Mass he adds the mass of his own sins.
“The Mass thought itself in possession of so many truths which seemed obvious to it.“ “But one possesses a truth completely only ... when one follows it through its proofs.“
For Herr Bauer, as for Hegel, truth is an automaton that proves itself. Man must follow it. As in Hegel, the result of real development is nothing but the truth proven , — i.e., brought to consciousness. Absolute Criticism may therefore ask with the most’ narrow-minded theologian:
“ What would be the purpose of history if it; task were not precisely to prove these simplest of all truths (such as the movement of the earth round the sun)?“
Just as, according to the earlier teleologists, plants exist to be eaten by animals, and animals to be eaten by men, history exists in order to serve as the act of consumption of theoretical eating — proving . Man exists so that history may exist, and history exists so that the proof of truths exists. In this Critically trivialised form is repeated the speculative wisdom that man exists, and history exists, so that truth may arrive at self-consciousness.
That is why history , like truth , becomes a person apart, a metaphysical subject of which the real human individuals are merely the bearers. That is why Absolute Criticism uses phrases like these:
“ History does not allow itself to be mocked at ... History has exerted its greatest efforts to ... History has been engaged ... what would be the purpose of History?... History provides the explicit proof ... History puts forward truths,“ etc.
If, as Absolute Criticism asserts, history has so far been occupied with only a few such truths — the simplest of all — which in the end are self-evident, this inadequacy to which Absolute Criticism reduces previous human experiences proves first of all only its own inadequacy. From the un-Critical standpoint the result of history is, on the contrary, that the most complicated truth, the quintessence of all truth, man, is self-evident in the end.
“But truths,“ Absolute Criticism continues to argue, “which seem to the mass to be so crystal-clear that they are self-evident from the start ... and that the mass regards proof of them as superfluous, are not worth history supplying explicit proof of them; they are in general no part of the problem which history is engaged in solving.“
In its holy zeal against the mass, Absolute Criticism pays it the finest compliment. If a truth is crystal-clear because it seems crystal-clear to the mass; if history’s attitude to truths depends on the opinion of the mass, then the verdict of the mass is absolute, infallible, the law of history, and history proves only what does not seem crystal-clear to the mass, and therefore needs proof. It is the mass, then, that prescribes history’s “task“ and “occupation“.
Absolute Criticism speaks of “truths which are self-evident from the start. In its Critical naivety it invents an absolute “ from the start “ and an abstract, immutable “ mass “. There is just as little difference, in the eyes of Absolute Criticism, between the “from the start“ of the sixteenth-century mass and the “from the start“ of the nineteenth-century mass as there is between those masses themselves. It is precisely the characteristic feature of a truth which has become true and obvious and is self-evident that it is “self-evident from the start “. Absolute Criticism’s polemic against truths which are self-evident from the start is a polemic against truths which are “self-evident“ in general.
A truth which is self-evident has lost its savour, its meaning, its value for Absolute Criticism as it has for divine dialectic . It has become flat, like stale water. On the one hand, therefore, Absolute Criticism proves everything which is self-evident and, in addition, many things which have the luck to be incomprehensible and therefore will never be self-evident. On the other hand, it considers as self-evident everything which needs some elaboration. Why? Because it is self -evident that real problems are not self-evident.
Since, the “Truth“, like history, is an ethereal subject separate from the material mass, it addresses itself not to the empirical man but to the “ innermost depths of the soul “; in order to be “ truly apprehended “ it does not act on his vulgar body , which may live deep down in an English cellar or at the top of a French block of flats; it “stretches“ “from end to end“ through his idealistic intestines. Absolute Criticism does certify that “the mass“ has so far in its own way, i.e., superficially, been affected by the truths that history has been so gracious as to “put forward“; but at the same time it prophesies that
“the attitude of the mass to historical progress will “ completely change “.
It will not be long before the mysterious meaning of this Critical prophecy becomes “crystal-clear“ to us.
“All great actions of previous history,“ we are told, “were failures from the start and had no effective success because the mass became interested in and enthusiastic over them — or, they were bound to come to a pitiful end because the idea underlying them was such that it had to be content with a superficial comprehension and therefore to rely on the approval of the mass.“
It seems that the comprehension which suffices for, and therefore corresponds to, an idea ceases to be superficial. It is only for appearance’s sake that Herr Bruno brings out a relation between an idea and its comprehension , just as it is only for appearance’s sake that he brings out a relation between unsuccessful historical action and the mass . If, therefore, Absolute Criticism condemns something as “superficial“, it is simply previous history, the actions and ideas of which were those of the “masses“. It rejects mass-type — history to replace it by Critical history (see Herr Jules Faucher on English problems of the day). According to previous un-Critical history, i.e., history not conceived in the sense of Absolute Criticism, it must further be precisely distinguished to what extent the mass was “ interested “ in aims and to what extent it was “ enthusiastic “ over them.. The “ idea “ always disgraced itself insofar as it differed from the “ interest “. On the other hand, it is easy to understand that every mass-type “ interest “ that asserts itself historically goes far beyond its real limits in the “ idea “ or “ imagination “ when it-first comes on the scene and is confused with human interest in general. This illusion constitutes what Fourier calls the tone of each historical epoch. The interest of the bourgeoisie in the 1789 Revolution, far from having been a “ failure “, “ won “ everything and had “ most effective success “, however much its “ pathos “ has evaporated and the “ enthusiastic “ flowers with which that Interest adorned its cradle have faded. That interest was so powerful that it was victorious over the pen of Marat, the guillotine of the Terror and the sword of Napoleon as well as the crucifix and the blue blood of the Bourbons. The Revolution was a “failure“ only for the mass which did not have in the political “idea“ the idea of its real “ interest “, i.e., whose true life-principle did not coincide with the life-principle of the Revolution, the mass whose real conditions for emancipation were essentially different from the conditions within which the bourgeoisie could emancipate itself and society. If the Revolution, which can exemplify all great historical “actions“, was a failure, it was so because the mass within whose living conditions it essentially came to a stop, was an exclusive, limited mass, not an all-embracing one. If the Revolution was a failure it was not because the mass was “ enthusiastic “ over it and “ interested “ in it, but because the most numerous part of the mass, the part distinct from the bourgeoisie, did not have its real interest in the principle of the Revolution, did not have a revolutionary principle of its own, but only an “ idea “, and hence only an object of momentary enthusiasm and only seeming uplift .
Together with the thoroughness of the historical action, the size of the mass whose action it is will therefore increase. In Critical history, according to which in historical actions it is not a matter of the acting masses, of empirical action, or of the empirical interest of this action, but instead is only “a matter of an idea in them “, things must naturally take a different course.
“ In the mass ,“ Criticism teaches us, “ not somewhere else, as its former liberal spokesmen believed, is the enemy of the spirit to be found .“
The Holy Family Chapter VI